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I have mind myself and recognize
Mind when I meet with it in any guise.
No one can know how glad I am to find
On any sheet the least display of mind.
—

Robert Frost
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
SYSTEMATIC DESENSITIZATION AND COVERT MODELING
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that a counter
conditioning model of systematic desensitization (SD is not
adequate to account for the success of the clinical proce
dures and to outline an alternate explanation of SD based
upon a cognitive mediational model and modeling theory.

SD

as an extinction procedure will also be discussed and weak
nesses in this analogue will be indicated.

Finally, the

clinical technical advantages accruing to a conceptualiza
tion of SD as a modeling procedure will be examined and
some suggestions will be made for future research.
According to Krasner (19?1)» the term "behavior therapy"
was first used by Lindsley, Skinner and Solomon, in 1951»
to describe the use of operant procedures to modify the
behavior of psychotic patients.

Since that time, this term

has come to be applied to a wide range of techniques de
rived, according to most proponents of behavior therapy,
though there are some notable exceptions (e.g..London, 1972),
from "modern learning theory".

A major argument advanced

in support of behavior therapy as a more viable approach to
behavior change than traditional psychotherapy is that be
havior therapy techniques are based upon experimentally
validated laws of learning (Eysenck, 1966; Rachman, 1973;
Wolpe, 1973* 1961).

M o d e m learning theory, i.e.,

1
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conditioning or reinforcement theory, is not, however,
without its critics.

Breger and McGaugh (1965) discuss

what they consider to be fatal flaws in the m o d e m learning
theory account of neurosis and psychotherapy.

Though they

critize classical conditioning and operant learning theo
ries in general, the theoretical and technical position re
presented by Eysenck and Wolpe, especially SD and counter
conditioning, are their main targets.

According to Breger and McGaugh, neither classical
conditioning nor operant theory yields a convincing ac
count of neurotic behavior or psychotherapeutic learning.
They suggest that to answer the question, what is learned,
in terms of cognitive mediation and learned strategies al
lows for a more complete account of observations from the
laboratory, from behavior therapy, and from psychotherapy,
than can be developed from either a classical conditioning
or operant perspective.
Rachman and Eysenck (1966) and Weist (1967) defend
behaviorism, arguing that the Breger and McGaugh attack
is a misrepresentation of and irrelevant to the behavior
istic position.

For example, Weist writes,

Misrepresentation occurred ... in the statement
that "the use of the terms stimulus and response
fby behavior therapists} is only remotely alle
gorical to the traditional use of there terms in
psychology ..." To support this view, Breger and
McGaugh referred to Bandura's ... review of Wolpe's
methods and states,"'The imagination of a scene' is
hardly an objectively defined stimulus ..." The
quoted statement is misleading because it confuses
stimulus and response and attributes the confusion
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to S-R theory. Imagination is a form of be
havior, not a stimulus ...
fpp. 215-2161 .
Even aside from the fact that calling imagination of a
scene the response rather than the stimulus just shifts the
problem rather than solves it (i.e., taking imagination of
a scene to be an objectively defined response "is only
remotely allegorical" etc.) Weist's analysis does not com
pletely clarify Wolpe's position.

Wolpe (1961) writes of

"presenting to the imagination of the deeply relaxed pa
tient" an anxiety-provoking stimulus.

Wolpe does not make

clear whether the imagination of the scene is the response,
the imagined scene, the stimulus, or the imagination of
which the scene is presented some sort of psychic struc
ture within the patient.

If imagination is taken as behavior, problems remain,
since the introduction of this sort of behavior into be
haviorism might require major adjustments within the para
digm.

Lazarus (1971b) points out that symbolic ability

might make human neuroses qualitatively different from ani
mal neurosesj

"The images and ideas that a patient under

going desensitization therapy may report cannot readily be
dismissed or subsumed under a facile analogy to experiments
with cats"

(p. 370).

Wolpe (1973) introduces, perhaps in

advertently, this same point, by suggesting that cognitive
abilities of the human animal provide a source of techni
cal innovations in the practice of behavior therapy not
available to experimenters working in laboratories with
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with less brainy creatures.

He writes,

In human subjects ... the treatment of neuroses
may be complicated ... However, endowed with lan
guage, we can unravel most webs and our very com
plexity gives to human behavior therapy the possi
bility of a large repertoire of techniques. For
example, some boys who have had frightening experi
ences at the stoves might lose their fears of
[similar] chests of drawers
to which the fears
had generalized by verbal explanation and physi
cal demonstration of the differences between the
two kinds of objects — one kind of solution not
available for the neuroses of animals fpp. 55-56].
Wolpe’s statement implies that dognition can function in a
mediational capacity, and it seems a violation of the claim
that behavior therapy techniques are derived directly from
laboratory experiment s.
Breger and McGaugh (1966), in a reply to Rachman and
Eysenck, argue that Rachman and Eysenck do not address the
original issues and that their position is a misrepresenta
tion of and irrelevant to the position outlined by Breger
and McGaugh, rather than the other way around as Rachman
and Eysenck claim.
Bolles (1972) also questions the utility of an auto
matic reinforcement view of learning and proposes that re
inforcement is neither necessary nor sufficient for learn
ing and explains behavior in terms of cognitive expectan
cies.

Bandura (197*0 rejects automatic reinforcement,

saying.
Contrary to popular belef, the fabled reflexive
conditioning in humans is largely a myth. Condi
tioning is simply a descriptive term for learning
through paired associations, not an explanation
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of how the changes come about ... So-called
conditioned reactions are largely selfactivated on the basis of learned expecta
tions [p. 8591 •
and,
.., there is little evidence that rewards func
tion as automatic strengtheners of human con
duct "[p. 860j,
Before further reviewing recent evidence and opinion, a
critical examination of Wolpe*s original experiment will
perhaps help to set the stage for a reconceptualization
of the theoretical base of SD.
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WOLPE'S EARLY WORK
Wolpe (1958) was the first to outline clinical SD
procedures and writes of them, "Of all the methods of
therapy considered in this book, the present parallels
most closely the experimental procedure of feeding cats
in the presence of increasing 'doses' of anxiety-evoking
stimuli" (p. 139).

This suggests that the strength of

claims for a scientific base for SD rests on the degree of
correspondence between clinical SD and Wolpe's experimen
tal procedure.

The validity of these claims is a reflec

tion of how definitively Wolpe's cat experiment rules out
other explanations of experimental neuroses that might be
offered as alternatives to the explanation Wolpe derives
from classical conditioning theory.
In an early review of experimental neurosis studies,
Cook (1939) isolates procedures which successfully elicit
from subjects behaviors termed neurotic.

Restraint of the

subject in the experimental chamber while requiring the sub
ject to make a difficult discrimination or to inhibit a
response in the presence of an excitatory stimulus seem
sufficient to produce experimental neuroses.

Most of the

studies reviewed by Cook used classical conditioning proce
dures.

Cook concludes that none of the explanations offer

ed by the authors of the studies reviewed is adequate to
account for all the data.
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Wolpe (1952) reviews many of these same studies,
analyzing them within a framework which he offers as ade
quate to explain the production of all experimental neuro
ses.

Like Cook, Wolpe implicates confinement as "a potent

factor in neurosis production."

He then divides all ex

perimental neuroses into two groups*

those produced by

ambivalent stimulation and those produced by noxious stimu
lation.

His basic thesis is that either of these variables

will generate anxiety in the subject and that this anxiety,
under conditions of confinement, will elicit those behavi
ors called neurotic.

Most of Wolpe's attention, clinically

and experimentally, has been directed toward neuroses pro
duced by noxious stimulation, SD procedure and rationale
being based upon this model of neurotic behavior.

Because

Wolpe's (1952) cat experiment plays such an important part
in the later development of SD, a critical examination of
this experiment seems in order.
fold purpose*

This experiment had a two

one, to demonstrate that conflict, as Mas-

serman (194-2) proposed, is not necessary for the produc
tion of neuroses, and two, that subjecting a confined ani
mal to noxious stimulation is sufficient to produce neu
rotic behavior.

Wolpe's claims notwithstanding, his experi

mental design did not allow a definitive test of either of
these hypotheses.
Wolpe's (1952) procedure included a replication of
Masserman's (194-2) experiment in which cats were trained
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to eat from a foodbox upon presentation of a signal;
then, whenever the cats made an approach response toward
the foodbox, a shock was paired with the signal.
conflict group was composed of those cats.

Wolpe*s

A no-conflict

group was also included; these cats were exposed to shock
preceded by a "hoot". Experimental neuroses were obtain
ed in the conflict group after two or three shocks and in
the no-conflict group after an initial series of five to
ten shocks followed by a second series of shocks one to
three days later.

During the deconditioning phase, neu

rotic behaviors in the no-conflict group faded more quickly
than in the conflict group.

These differences seem to

weaken Wolpe's claim that conflict is not implicated in
the development of experimental neuroses,

Wolpe's account

also leaves unexplained the efficacy of feeding the cats
prior to putting them in the experimental chamber for re
ducing the neurotic behavior (Masserman, 19^-2).
Wolpe (1958, 1952) defines neurosis as persistent unadaptive behavior acquired by learning, usually character
ized by anxiety (anxiety always being part of the casual
sequence).

The immediate reactions of the experimental

cats to the shock (**... rushing hither and thither, getting
up on the hind legs, clawing at the floor, roof and sides
of the experimental cage, crouching, trembling, spitting
,,,," etc.) do not qualify as neurotic, given Wolpe's de
finition.

His position on this point is unclearj though
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not stating explicitly that these behaviors are neurotic,
Wolpe does refer to them as symptoms.

The initial responses

were not persistent and for two reasons should not be con
sidered unadaptive.

One, the design of the experiment did

not allow the emergence of any adaptive behavior during
the shock phase, i.e., behavior which led to the reduction
of pain, and, two, the topography of the initial responses
suggests that they might be considered escape attempts.
Had the cats not been confined, their responses would have
removed them from the aversive situation.

Wolpe (1952)

does specify three lasting behaviors which he clearly con
siders neurotic:

"(1) resistance to being put into the

experimental cage; (2) signs of anxiety when inside the
cage (muscular tension and myriasis were invariable);
(3) refusal to eat meat pellets anywhere in the cage even
after one, two or three days* starvation** (p. 255).

Of

these, only refusal to eat seems even remotely unadaptive,
given the empirical association of shock with the experi
mental cage.
To decondition the cats to the experimental chamber,
they were fed in one of three rooms which seemed "to the
human eye and ear, to have decreasing degrees of resem
blance" to the experimental room, beginning with the most
dissimilar room and proceeding to the experimental room.
The cats were moved from one room into the next only after
no anxiety was observed in the more dissimilar room.
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Wolpe reasoned that the reeding response inhibited the anxi
ety and that this reciprocal inhibition provided the thera
peutic potency of the procedure.

As noted above, clinical

SD procedures are based upon this experiment.

Though there

is a superficial resemblance between the experimental and
clinical procedures, the analogy from experiment to clini
cal application breaks down in several places.
Physical restraint of the experimental subject is
widely accepted as an essential condition for eliciting an
experimental neurosis.

Wolpe (1952) assumes that "the force

of habits previously learned" is equivalent to confinement
as it is used in experimental neurosis studies.

Without

the support of experimental data, this seems a weak corres
pondence.

Wolpe does not provide this evidence and Davison

(1968) writes,
... the author has sought vainly in the experi
mental literature for paradigms which illustrate
the acquisition of stable fear responses in
human beings under conditions bearing even a re
mote resemblance to what would likely hold in
real life jp. 98J •
The lack of congruence between "presenting to the imagina
tion of the deeply relaxed patient" an anxiety-provoking
scene and feeding cats in a room which seemed "to the hu
man eye and ear" to resemble a room feared by the cats has
been commented upon above.

Finally, the experimental sub

jects were held in each of the deconditioning rooms until
there was no indication of anxiety* in SD, clinical subjects
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are instructed to signal anxiety, upon which the scene is
immediately withdrawn.

Wolpe*s claim that SD closely

parallels experimental procedures seems highly tenuous.
An evaluation of other evidence demonstrates that Wolpe*s
cat experiment is a definitive statement neither of the con
ditions under which experimental neuroses occur nor of the
essential elements for treatment, and casts further doubt
on the claim that human neuroses can be adequately under
stood in terms of experimental evidence generated by mod
ern learning theory.
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Solomon and Wynne (1953) and Solomon, Kamin, and
Wynne (1955) varied the parameters studied by Wolpe.

Dogs

placed in a shuttle box were presented with a CS and ten
seconds later shocked.

The shock continued until the dogs

jumped over a barrier into the safe (non-shock) chamber.
This behavior quickly established as an avoidance response,
often occurring less than two seconds after the presenta
tion of the CS.

This behavior was totally resistant to

ordinary extinction, the dogs continuing to jump after
hundreds of no-shock trials, each dog developing a ritu
alistic, stereotyped set of behaviors which were performed
in addition to the jumping response.

To eliminate the jump

ing behavior, a three second shock, administered when the
dog jumped into the previously safe chamber from the origi
nal shock chamber, was introduced.

Though this did disrupt

the ritual behavior somewhat, the dogs acting as if they
were anticipated or expected the shock to occur as a result
of jumping, the jumping was not eliminated.
This behavior satisfied Wolpe*s criteria for experi
mental neuroses; it is persistent, unadaptive, and learned.
However, in this case the neurosis is not generated by
pairing an aversive stimulus with restraint, but by pair
ing shock with the performance of an avoidance response
while providing no opportunities for the dogs to learn al
ternative avoidance strategies.

As in the case of Wolpe*s

12
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cats, the dogs* behaviors appear to be experimental ana
logues of human neurosis, in this case obsessive-compul
sive behavior.
some weaknesses.

But a point-by-point comparison reveals
Solomon (1964) writes.

My guess at the moment is that experimental neu
rotic disturbances arise often in those cases
where consummatory behavior or instinctive behavi
or is punished, and punished under nondiscriminatory control {p. 251]•
The relationship between punishing consummatory or instinc
tive behavior in animals and the conditions under which
human neuroses occur is unclear.

Not only is consummatory

or instinctive behavior difficult to specify in the eti
ology of human neuroses punishing stimuli which might be
hypothesized to account for a particular neurosis are sel
dom as clearly defined as an electric shock of a given in
tensity and duration.

Note also that these conditions are

not those outlined by Wolpe (1952).
More recent research indicates that aversive stimuli
have effects determined by the context in which they occur.
Holz and Azrin (1962, 1961) report that experimental neu
roses can be obtained in rate by shocking them while they
are restrained.

If the same shock is made a discrimina

tive stimulus for reinforcement, however, no neuroses de
velop.

It might be said that neuroses do not develop when

the aversive event is made part of a predictive relation
ship with other environmental events.
These two examples should make it clear that Wolpe did
not adequately define the parameters which influence a sub-
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ject's response to the experimental conditions he manip
ulated (shock and restraint) and that one must look else
where for an adequate account of these and Wolpe's findings.
Bolles (1972, 1970, 1967) postulates the existence of
species specific defense reactions (SSDR's), interpreting
escape and avoidance in terms of these reactions.

His basic

thesis is that in escape and avoidance experiments, the sub
jects learn, not a discrete response, but an expectance,
i.e., a predictive relation between aversive environmental
events and which SSDR is effective in escaping or avoiding
them.

Assuming the validity of this thesis (successful

tests of hypotheses derived from Bolles*s theory are re
ported by Peterson and Lyon (1975) and Weisinger, Parker
and Skarupsk (1974)? indirect supporting evidence is re
ported by Azerin, Hutchinson, and Hake (1967), Azrin and
Norman (1964), and Ulrich and Azrin (1962).

The experi

mental neuroses obtained by Wolpe in his cats can be view
ed as thwarted escape behaviors.

This integrates restraint

into the theoretical picture, rather than just listing it
as a prior condition necessary for the generation of experi
mental neuroses as Wolpe does.

Bolles's hypotheses also

make sense of the change observed in the topography of the
cats* behaviors, providing a rationale for expecting the
more passive behavior Wolpe reports as a lasting effect
of the shock/restraint procedure to follow the active "es
cape” attempts reported as immediate effect.

This suggests
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that the cats learned not a collection of discrete re
sponses as Wolpe supposes, but helplessness, i.e., that
no response was effective for escaping or avoiding the
shock. This serve a better account of Wolpe’s (1952) find
ings than classical conditioning can provide.
These same concepts can account for the findings re
ported by Solomon, et al. (1953)*

The dogs learned that

the CS predicted the occurrence of interminable shock and
responded to the expectancy by jumping the barrier to
avoid this shock.

When the three second shock was intro

duced, the dogs gave every indication of learning this
second expectancy, that jumping is followed by shock, but
continued to jump in response to the original expectancy
of interminable shock.

This interpretation is partially

supported by a third procedure employed to eliminate jump
ing.

A glass partition was installed across the escape

hatch to prevent the dogs from jumping upon presentation
of the CS.

This procedure more effectively reduced jump

ing on trials when the partition was removed than did the
three second shock procedure, with Solomon, et. al. pre
dicting that had it been continued longer, it would have
been totally effective.

Solomon (Rescorla and Solomon,

1967) later concluded that the important feature of avoid
ance is learning the predictive relationwhip between the
CS and the aversive stimuli.
The above explanation also accounts for Holz and
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Azrin’s (1962, 1961) findings.

If an aversive stimulus

is made a discriminative stimulus, its meaning to the
subject changes.

The subject reacts to it as a way of

manipulating the environment, rather than with helpless
ness to a punishing and unresponsive environment.
The analysis of the studies reviewed above suggests
that Wolpe*s cat experiment is a definitive statement of
neither the conditions under which human neuroses develop
nor the elements necessary for their treatment, and casts
doubt on the relevance of much of the research generated
by m o d e m learning theory for understanding human neuroses.
This does not mean that there is nothing of use to the
clinician to be learned from these studies.

The question,

what is learned, is raised by this analysisj certainly
cognitive factors which have been largely ignored by pro
ponents of conditioning and reinforcement theories are im
plicated.

Bandura (197^* 1971* 1969) has integrated these

factors into social learning theory and derived from this
theory a highly effective behavior change technique.

A

consideration of those aspects of social learning theory
necessary for a a reconceptualization of SD as a modeling
procedure is presented below.
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SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY:
A SHORT SUMMARY
Bandura's (197^» 1971* 1969) basic thesis is that a be
havior is determined by the anticipated consequences of per
forming that behavior.

That is, what is learned is a symbolic

representation of behavior and the associated consequences of

D
R
that behavior, rather than a peripheral S-R or S -R-S connec
tion.

("Originally, conditioning was assumed to occur auto

matically.

On closer examination, it turned out to be cogni

tively mediated" (Bandura, 197^» P* 859).)

Social learning

theory has three important distinguishing characteristics:
(1) no response is required by the theory for learning to take
place; (2) learning can occur in the absence of reinforcement;
and (3) covert processes can be manipulated to produce behavior
change.

Each of these are discussed below.

Learning occurs first as a central event:
When a person observes a model's behavior, but other
wise performs no overt responses, he can acquire the
modeled responses while they are occurring only in
cognitive, representational forms [Bandura, 1969*
p. 133J .
Social learning theory thus distinguishes between acquisition
and performance.

During acquisition, patterns of behavior come

to be represented cognitively in verbal and imaginal form.

Ban

dura implies that cognitive acquisition always precedes, except
in the case of reflexive behaviors, the overt performance of
any behavior.

Learning is not the acquisition of a response,

17
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the acquisition of a response, but the cognitive represen
tation of a predictive relationship (see also, Bolles, 1972).
Reinforcement (used here as a generic term to cover all
response consequences), though it may facilitate learning,
is not taken to be necessary for learning.

Bandura (1974)

writes, "The capacity to represent modeled activities sym
bolically enables man to acquire new patterns of behavior
observationally without reinforced enactment" (p. 863).
This does not mean that reinforcement is inconsequential.
In accounting for performance, as opposed to acquisition,
reinforcement serves two major functions in social learning
theory.

First, reinforcement conveys information to the

observer regarding the potential outcome of any given be
havior, thereby allowing the observer to develop sets of
expectancies or predictive relationships between behavior
and its consequences for the actor.

Thus, if one observes

an actor punishes for a particular behavior, one is less
likely to perform that behavior even though the requisite
skills are possessed.

Second, reinforcement functions as

a motivational influence.

Behaviors acquire incentive value

for the observer as a result of the consequences which are
observed to follow from them.

Thus, though learning can

occur without reinforcement, the learned skills are not
likely to be performed unless appropriate reinforcement
has been observed to follow from their performance.
It is clear from this discussion that reinforcement

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

does not have the same meaning in social learning theory
as it has in traditional instrumental learning or operant
theory.

Bandura distinguishes social learning reinforce

ment from traditional conceptions of reinforcement by
emphasizing its vicarious nature.

This shift from direct

to vicarious reinforcement changes the meaning of the con
cept.

Vicarious reinforcement is not an event which di

rectly affects the strength or frequency of the behavior
which preceded itj it involves a judgment by the observeri
"If that's what people get for acting that way, I will
(or will not) do that."

Vicarious reinforcement is then

a synonym for reward/punishment in the vernacular and im
plies awareness.
If learning, in the form of symbolic and representa
tional cognitive coding, can occur without reinforcement
and prior to any overt response, and if this learning can
guide subsequent behavior, then, of course, if the cogni
tive coding is changed, the behavior will change.

There

is ample evidence that modeling procedures developed by
Bandura do work (see Marlatt

&

Perry, 1975 and Rimm and Mas

ters, 197 ^ t for discussions of the clinical application of
these procedures).

Cautela (1971* cited in Kazdin, 1973)

has reasoned that if behavior is represented verbally and
imaginally, then altering these directly by covert means
would eliminate the need for ov;'st modeling of the desired
behavior.

Cautela terms the procedure he developed to ac

complish this "covert Modeling."

Before discussing this
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procedure, recent attempts to demonstrate that SD is a
cognitive, rather than counter-conditioning therapy are
reviewed and their relationship to covert modeling dis
cussed.
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SYSTEMATIC DESENSITIZATION AND COGNITION
There have been several recent efforts to interpret
SD as a cognitive procedure.

This literature is reviewed

below and an attempt is made to abstract from these stud
ies those common features which suggest viewing SD as a
variation of covert modeling.
Beck (1970) discusses the issues raised by Breger
and McGaugh (1965), but from a different perspective, be
ing more concerned with the logical implications of be
havior therapy techniques than with the theoretical ade
quacy of classical conditioning and operant models.

Thera

peutic procedures are divided into behavioral and cognitive
categories on the basis of whether, in Beck’s judgment, a
tapping of cognitive processes is implied by the procedure.
Judged along this dimension, SD is placed in the cognitive
group.

Bergin (1970) and Locke (1971) agree, Bergin say

ing, "It is difficult. . . to imagine how desensitization
can be considered to be a ’behavioral' procedure in any de
finitive sense (p. 206), and Locke writes, "The procedures
could hardly be called behavioristic in view of the fact
that they all pertain to the patient’s conscious experi
ence" (p. 321).
Valins and Ray (19&7) and Conger,

Conger and 3rehm,

(1976) report success with cognitive relabeling procedures,
reducing avoidance behavior by relabeling subjects’ per
ceptions of their own reactions to feared objects.

By

leading subjects to believe that they do not react

21
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physiologically to feared stimuli, avoidance of these
stimuli can be reduced.

These authors interpret this find

ing as support for the position that SD operates in this
manner ("If I am relaxed, I cannot be frightened of the
object I am imagining.").

SD may work through this sort of

mechanism but the experimental procedures used by Valins
and Ray or by Conger, et. al. do not demonstrate this.

The

findings do support the notion that behavior can be changed
by changing cognitions.
Other studies have demonstrated the importance of cog
nitive expectancy for therapeutic behavior change (Brown,
1973* Lott

&

Murray, 1975* Tori & Woreil, 1973)•

Usually

these studies proceed by exposing different groups to dif
ferent treatment instructions, then administering SD or some
variation thereof, and finally measuring outcomes of the dif
ferent groups.

Though these studies are often interpreted

as support for a cognitive interpretation of SD, these inter
pretations are misguided* they demonstrate the effects in
structional set can have on procedures which folios, but
these studies are not tests of the theoretical rationals
underlying the procedures (Evans, 1973).

As with the re

labeling studies, the results are suggestive —

if cognitive

expectancy can effect the outcome of therapy- perhaps ther
apy is just a way of changing expectance —
more than suggestive.

but they are no

These studies support the hypothesis

that different pretreatment procedures designed to manipu
late cognitive expectancy do affect the outcome of therapy,
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but these studies are not tests of a counter-conditioning
explanation of SD.

The author could find only one study

which reported expectancy alone to be sufficient for pro
ducing change.

Marcia, Rubin & Efron (1969) compared out

comes of SD and "a technique (T-scope therapy) embodying
the expectancy manipulating features of systematic desensi
tization, but without the technical elements of the proce
dure" (p. 382).

No significant differences in outcome were

obtained between the two therapies.

The authors point out

that of theoretical importance is that none of the T-scope
patients got worse, though a classical conditioning model
predicts such an outcome.
Wilkins (1971) reviewed several SD studies and summar
izes well the position of the proponents of a cognitive
mediational approach to behavior change.

He writes,

... in light of investigation reported predomonately
in the last two years, the original theoretical
formulations appear to be inadequate in providing an
understanding of the nature of the learning involved
in desensitization. Strong trends in the recent
evidence indicate that neither relaxation training
nor hierarchy construction are [sicQ necessary for
successful therapy outcome. It appears that the
only necessary element of the desensitization pro
cedure is the cognitive element of instructed imag
ination of fear-relevant scenes.
It appears that the cognitive and social aspects
of the therapeutic situation... are critical variables
for successful therapeutic outcome,
£pp. 315-316J .
Though the studies reported here and those reviewed by Wil
kins are suggestive of this hypothesis (of the cognitive
relabeling and expectancy studies discussed here, all have
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Zk
imagination of fear-relevant scenes in common), none are
definitive tests of a cognitive explanation of SD.

There

are, however, other studies which lend additional support
to the position that imagination of fear-relevant scenes is
the crucial variable.
In a study of non-specific factors in behavior therapy,
Gelder, Bancroft, Gath, Johnston, Mathews

St

Shaw (1973)

found a non-specific control treatment which included imag
ination of fear-relevant scenes to be almost as effective as
SD in reducing avoidance behavior.

Flooding, which con

sisted almost exclusively of imagination of fear-relevant
scenes, was the most effective treatment.

The apparent ad

vantage of SD over the non-specific control could perhaps
be accounted for by the concentration of expectancy effects
in the SD and flooding groups.

Other studies which have

imagination of fear-relevant stimuli in common though
other parameters of SD are varied include studies of free
associating to feared stimuli while relaxed (Wilson

&

Smith, 1968), directed discussion of hierarchy items while
relaxed (Wollersheim, 197*0. and temporally standardized
presentation of hierarchy items without regard to anxiety
signalling (Ross & Proctor, 1973). successful procedures
all.
Lazarus (1971a) working within a clinical framework,
has expressed dissatisfaction with the "old method" of SD
and suggests that it can be made more effective if a wide
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range of cognitive and affective variables is taken ac
count of and incorporated into the therapeutic procedures.
Not all writers agree about the usefulness of cogni
tive concepts.

Wolpe (1973) reviews many of these same

studies and rejects them as support for a cognitive inter
pretation of behavior therapy, citing Sushinsky and Bootzin
(1970) and Kent, Wilson

&

Nelson (1972) as examples of re

search that is methodologically superior to the cognitive
studies and that support classical conditioning theory.
Kent, et. al. do support Wolpe, but Sushinsky and Bootzin
question only the technical contribution made by the cogni
tive workers, while agreeing that there is evidence to indi
cate that cognitive factors might be important for thera
peutic change.

Davison (1968), at one time, reported

"strong support for the hypothesis that behavior change pro
duced by systematic desensitization reflects a counter
conditioning process" (p. 96).
Valins (Davison

&

More recently, writing with

Valins, 1969) and with Lazarus (Lazarus

&

Davison, 1971)# Davison assumes a favorable position toward
the hypothesis that therapeutic behavior change can some
times be attributed to cognitive variables.
Nawas (1970) and Ullraan (1970) also express some reluc
tance to accept a cognitive view of behavior therapy pro/

cedures, though neither suggests that cognitive concepts have
no place in psychology.

Ullraan proposes that if cognitions

are treated as behavior, the behavioral/cognitive conflict
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would be resolved.

Allowing that covert behavior can in

fluence overt behavior has implications beyond those dis
cussed by Ullraan.

Cognitive behavior, as was pointed out

above, may be qualitatively different from overt behavior,
that is, it may mediate overt behavior, and follow differ
ent laws.

Simply assuming that human cognitive behavior is

analogous to overt behavior obtained in an animal labora
tory solves no problems.

Nawas also suggests that cogni

tions be treated as behavior but seems more liberal than
Ullman;

He defends the S-R perspective as, for the pre

sent, the most profitable model to follow, but says,
"Cognitions are not irrelevant* and once empirical and
fecund evidence is presented to confirm such a view, only
the inept or the bigot would dismiss it" (p.368).
The research reviewed here, though not a clear-cut
test of a cognitive interpretation of SD, clearly supports
the position that cognition is, indeed, not irrelevant.
Instructed imagination has been offered as a relevant
parameter for affecting therapeutic change, but the problem
of fitting this into a theoretical framework remains.

Two

SD studies remain to be reviewed which provide clues that
are helpful for solving this problem.
Burgraff (1974) found SD as effective as traditional
sorts of speech therapy for reducing stuttering.

Unless

stuttering can somehow be shown to be a learned avoidance
reaction, there seems little reason why SD should function
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to reduce it.

That is, the topography of the stuttering

situation is only metaphorically similar to the experimen
tal neurosis situation through which Wolpe*s cats suffered.
Stuttering, however, could be a behavioral expression of
anxiety, SD succeeding by teaching the stutterer to relax
in those situations which elicit this particular unadaptive
response.

If the SD hierarchy is "a list of stimulus situa

tions to which a patient reacts with graded amounts of
anxiety," and if stuttering is a behavioral expression of
anxiety, stuttering should increase as anxiety increases.
No such relation was discovered in this study.

Perhaps

these results could be interpreted as due to the oppor
tunity provided by the SD situation for imaginal self
modeling of normal speech.
Mann (1972) reports equal success with three techniques
for treating test anxiety.

One group of students was shown

a videotaped SD session of a fellow student being treated
for test anxiety and instructed to follow the therapist’s
instruction and to imitate the client.

A second group saw

the same session but was instructed only to concentrate on
the content of the session.

The third group saw only the

client progressing through the hierarchy and told to con
centrate on the content of the items.

Features required

by a counter-conditioning model sure absent for this third
group (there is no competing response nor anxiety signal).
Standard modeling did not occur, as Mann suggests, there
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being no modeling of test taking behavior.

Again, iaagi-

nal modeling seems one likely candidate.
Covert modeling (CM) is the instructed imagination
of a model engaged in the performance of some target be
havior.

Though it developed independently of SD research,

deriving from social learning theory, the rationale under
lying CM seems to fit recent findings from SD experiments
very well.

The element which SD research seems to suggest

as necessary and sufficient for therapeutic success, in
structed imagination of fear-relevant scenes, is included
in CM procedure, and CM has been demonstrated successful
in reducing avoidance behavior (Cautela, Flannery & Hanley,
197^* Kazdin, 197^* 197^# 1973)* though there have been
no direct comparisons of CM and SD.
Though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this
paper, a short note regarding SD and extinction models
seems in order.

The typical classical conditioning extinc

tion generally pairs on unconditioned stimulus with a con
ditioned stimulus (such as a light with an electric shock)
until the subject comes to respond to the conditioned stimu
lus as it initially responded to the unconditioned stimulus
During the extinction phase, the conditioned stimulus is
presented repeatedly without the unconditioned stimulus
until it no longer elicits the response.

This paradigm

would seem to explain very well what occurs during SD ex
cept that the results from avoidance learning experiments
do not support extinction as a rapid method to eliminate
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avoidance behavior (Solomon, 1964), unless response preven
tion or forced exposure is used (Masserman, 19^-2).

How

ever, as seen above, if these procedures are introduced
into the extinction paradigm, the choice between a classi
cal conditioning and cognitive expectancy explanation of
the subsequent reduction in avoidance behavior is not so
clear as when extinction is used alone.

Classical condi

tioning predicts that once an avoidance response is firmly
established, it should immediately begin to extinguish,
since the subject is no longer experiencing the aversive
stimulus.

Except when extremely powerful aversive stimuli

are used, this does occur.

However, clinical phobias of

very long standing can be rapidly eliminated with SD.
Response prevention or forced exposure can speed up the ex
tinction process, but SD does not incorporate these pro
cedures, avoidance being freely available to the subject in
the form of the anxiety signal.

Since avoidance can occur,

the question remains of why SD "extinction" proceeds more
rapidly than the normally expected extinction observed in
most avoidance behavior experiments.

It can be argued that

the competing response functions to speed up the extinction.
As was pointed out above, neither relaxation nor the anxi
ety signal is necessary for successful desensitization with
SD.

If these are removed from the SD procedure, the remain

ing treatment resembles flooding, a treatment that is a
much better analogy to respondent extinction than is SD.
However, experimental support for flooding as the treatment
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of choice over SD is weak (Rimm & Masters, 197*0 * leaving
the question of the role played by respondent extinction
in SD open.
Operant extinction experiments typically proceed in
the following manner.

A particular response is followed by

a reinforcing stimulus (e.g., a bar press followed by a
food pellet).

Once this response is occurring regularly,

the reinforcing stimulus is withdrawn, resulting in the ex
tinction of the response.

In SD, if the avoidance response

is taken as the operant to be extinguished, an operant ex
tinction paradigm does not fit the SD procedure.

The client

is not required to make the response which is to be extin
guished and it is unclear exactly what reinforcing stimulus
is being withheld.

Operant extinction is strongly influ

enced by the individual history of the subject (Skinner,
1953)t so that unless similar developmental histories relat
ing to the acquisition of phobic responses can be demon
strated across subjects, the success of SD suggests the
operation of processes other than operant extinction.

Kaz-

din (1973) has compared an imaginal operant extinction pro
cedure to CM and found it ineffective, though it should be
pointed out that the temporal parameters manipulated by Kazdin might be outside the range required for effective ex
tinction.

Nevertheless, it appears that, as with respondent

extinction, the role of operant extinction in SD remains
open.
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A PROPOSAL
Interpreting SD as a covert modeling procedure ap
pears reasonable and recent SD research supports this in
terpretation.

Unless an experimental test can be made of

this interpretation, it remains largely speculative.

The

following are some suggestions for making this comparison.
Subjects would ideally be drawn from a clinical popu
lation (Bernstein

&

Paul, 1971)i discuss the dangers of

using volunteer subjects to test clinical procedures , but
in order to standardize assessment procedures and hierarchy
content across subjects, volunteer subjects who report hav
ing fear of an easily specifiable stimulus (e.g., harmless
snakes) are acceptable for an initial test.

Subjects

should be screened using an instrument such as the Fear
Survey Schedule to insure high fear levels.

The screening

instrument should not be part of the pre-treatment test
battery.
Subjects should be randomly assigned to two groups* one
group to undergo pre-testing, the second group to receive
treatment without pre-testing.

From each of these groups

subjects could be assigned to an SD group, a CM group, and
an exposure-control (E-C) group.

This procedure results in

a 3 x 2 analysis of variance design.
Initial instructions for all groups are the same, stat
ing that the procedure used is widely accepted as effective
for reducing fears and avoidance behavior and explaining

51
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the rationale for using imaginal processes.

However, the

S-C group is told that there will be a waiting period dur
ing which they will discuss their fears with a therapist,
the subjects being allowed to control the content of the
discussion.

The most effective treatment should be made

available to them later.
All groups should be given relaxation training and
should construct hierarchies.
The SD group receives standard SD.

CM and E-C sub

jects should be yoked to the SD subjects to control for
time in therapy.

CM subjects are given no instructions to

relax nor is an anxiety signal used.

Hierarchy items are

presented to them in random order, each subject being asked
to imagine a model performing the behaviors specified in
the scene, and to imagine the scene as if they are there
with the model.

The E-C group meets with a therapist and

discusses the hierarchy items, again arranged into random
order.
Post-test assessment (identical to the pre-test)
should include a behavioral approach test, and might also
include such items as measures of self-competence and in
ternal-external locus of control (see Bandura, 1975* for
discussion of a comprehensive assessment plan).

Ideally,

follow-up testing should be included.
A counter-conditioning model predicts that the SD
group will improve.

This model also predicts that the CM

group will get worse, because anxiety provoking stimuli
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are presented without a competing response, and that no
change will be observed in the E-C group, because this pro
cedure includes procedures associated with neither desensiti
zation nor sensitization (i.e., though fear relevant scenes,
in general, are being discussed, avoidance can operate since
the subjects are in control of the specific content of the
session).
Social learning theory predicts that both the CM and
the SD groups will improve, because both procedures include
imaginal modeling of the phobic behavior.

No change in the

E-C group is predicted since the relevant therapeutic vari
able is not being manipulated.
This experiment could provide supporting evidence for
rejecting a counter-conditioning account of SD in favor of
a social learning interpretation.
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CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
Assuming experimental support for the position taken
here, some important implications for clinical practice
should be noted.

Some of these implications, while im

portant to the clinician, are only tangentially related to
applied matters.

For example, a wide range of techniques

might come to be subsumed under the same theoretical ra
tionale* in addition to SD, procedures such as role rever
sal, role playing (self-modeling), and psychodrama, all
seem likely candidates as modeling procedures.

Because so

cial learning experiments require a shorter “analogic leap"
to reach the clinical side than do traditional classical
conditioning or operant experiments, the credibility of the
claim by behavior therapists for experimental support would
be much less strained than at present.

Some contributions

of this sort of research would be more directly related to
applied concerns.

If guides to behavior are cognitively

coded in verbal form as social learning theory suggests,
verbal therapy might be made more effective by teaching
therapists to model appropriately verbal representations
of target behaviors until the client can comfortably repli
cate this performance (see Goldiamond and Dryud, 1968, for
an interesting discussion of the "influence exerted by ver
bal behaviors over other behavior in general.")

34
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